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Abstract
This paper focusses on the reallocation of labour resources in a New Keynesian environ-
ment with labour market search and endogenous separations. We show that introduction of
variation in hours per worker alters the incentives for intertemporal substitution in a way
that generates a more steeply downward sloping Beveridge curve and reduces the tendency
to synchronise gross job flows. This also enables the New Keynesian model to capture the
interaction of hours and employment at business cycle frequencies. We show that the impact
of labour supply elasticity on the slope of the Beveridge curve and the correlation of gross
job flows is determined primarily by variation in the response to monetary shocks. When
hours variation is suppressed the comovement of job creation with job destruction and of
unemployment with vacancies are strongly positive in response to monetary shocks. Whereas
with variation in hours both measures of reallocation take on the correct negative sign.
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and Hours in a New Keynesian Model" and "Unemployment, Labour Market Dynamics and the New NeoClassical
Synthesis". I am responsible for any errors. Correspondence should be addressed to Richard Holt, Economics,
University of Edinburgh, William Robertson Building, 50 George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9JY, Scotland; E-mail:
Richard.Holt@ed.ac.uk .
Job Reallocation, Unemployment and Hours in a New Keynesian Model
1 Introduction.
Recent research extends the New Keynesian paradigm to incorporate labour market search, mo-
tivated by the explicit account it provides of unemployment.1 Following Shimer (2005) and Hall
(2005), who argue that unemployment dynamics are driven by fluctuations in outflows not in-
flows, the bulk of the literature holds the inflow (separation) rate constant.2 Yet, subsequent
empirical evidence indicates that inflows variation also plays an important role in unemployment
dynamics.3 This makes a model with endogenous separations a natural starting point. The
Mortensen Pissarides (1994) features endogenous separation of the least productive matches to
provide a Schumpeterian explanation of microeconomic restructuring and the reallocation of re-
sources to more productive activities that underlies economic growth and fluctuations, see Davis
et al. (1998). In the literature on restructuring the slope of the Beveridge curve (correlation of un-
employment with vacancies) and the synchronisation of gross job flows (correlation of job creation
with job destruction) are critical measures of the reallocation process. Both are negative in US
data. Suppressing inflow variation, i.e. following Shimer (2005), avoids the synchronisation of job
flows and generates a downward sloping Beveridge curve. However, it does so by assuming away
reallocation decisions. The Schumpeterian perspective on business cycles suggests that recessions
are the best time to undertake microeconomic restructuring, since the opportunity costs of doing
so are low. Mortensen and Pissarides (1993) show that a temporary shock to profitability produces
strong positive correlation of gross job flows and an upward sloping Beveridge curve, in the context
of a (constrained) eﬃcient equilibrium labour market search model with endogenous separations
(one which satisfies the Hosios condition).4 Krause and Lubik (2007) find a similar eﬀect in a
New Keynesian framework when, as in the Mortensen-Pissarides model, labour input varies on
1 Authors have examined the role played by labour market search, and wage rigidities in determining dynamic
behaviour of unemployment, output and inflation. In so doing they address the amplification and persistence
puzzles highlighted by Shimer (2005), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), Cogley and Nason (1995).
2 These include Moyen and Sahuc (2005), Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005), Christoﬀel et al. (2006), Jung and Kuester
(2006), Trigari (2006), Faia (2007), Kuester (2007) and Thomas (2007).
3 Elsby et al. (2007) show that Shimer’s result that unemployment inflows are invariant over the cycle is overstated
even using his own data and methodology. Davis et al. (2006) and Fujita and Ramey (2006) present evidence from
job flows and other data sources to support the view that inflows are an important component of unemployment
dynamics at business cycle frequencies, accounting for up to a third of the variation in unemployment.
4 Suppressing inflow variation avoids the synchronisation of job flows and generates a downward sloping Beveridge
curve. However, it does so by assuming away reallocation decisions.
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the extensive margin(s) only. It is possible to reconcile models of reallocation and restructuring
with the facts while adhering to the Hosios condition by incorporating additional features into
firms’ decision problems so as to alter the incentives for intertemporal substitution. For example,
Mortensen (1994) achieves this by introducing on-the-job search and distinguishing between job
and worker flows, while Den Haan et al. (2000) do so by including capital accumulation.
This paper examines the reallocation of labour resources in a New Keynesian environment with
labour market search and endogenous separations. We show that introduction of variation in hours
per worker alters the incentives for intertemporal substitution in a way that generates a downward
sloping Beveridge curve and reduces the tendency to synchronise gross job flows. This also enables
the New Keynesian model to capture the positive comovement of hours and employment at business
cycle frequencies.5 The New Keynesian framework imposes the discipline of general equilibrium
on our analysis. It introduces frictions in price setting which permits meaningful discussion of
the impact of both productivity and monetary shocks.6 We show that the eﬀect of labour supply
elasticity on the slope of the Beveridge curve and the correlation of gross job flows is determined
primarily by changes in the response to monetary shocks. Specifically, under inelastic hours the
comovement of job creation with job destruction and of unemployment with vacancies are strongly
positive in response to monetary shocks, whereas under elastic hours both measures of reallocation
take on the correct negative sign. The volatility of unemployment is relatively high with or without
hours variation. The introduction of hours variation raises the variation of unemployment, but
reduces that of vacancies. Variation in hours reduces the variability of wages, but this remains
too high. Moreover, vacancies fail to exhibit suﬃcient persistence and are too strongly correlated
with job creation.
The mechanism by which hours per worker aﬀects reallocation is relatively straightforward.
Variation of hours per worker allows existing matches to adjust labour input to shocks by varying
5 Fluctuation in hours per worker accounts for a substantial proportion of the variation in labour input at business
cycle frequencies, Cho and Cooley (1994). Despite its role in labour input variation hours per worker is frequently
omitted from models with labour market search, presumably on grounds of parsimony.
6 Shimer (2005) notes that an upward sloping Beveridge curve arises when exogenous shocks to the (aggregate) job
destruction rate are permitted - this may be interpreted as an aggregate reallocative shock. It is possible that a
suitable choice of correlation of reallocative shocks and productivity shocks could generate a Beveridge curve with
the appropriate slope. However, Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) are unable to find a clear and important role for
such aggregate reallocative shocks. For this reason it is more interesting to examine whether a negatively sloped
Beveridge curve can arise when job destruction varies endogenously in response to aggregate productivity and
money supply growth disturbances, which are standard in a New Keynesian setting.
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hours as well as through separations - firms equate marginal costs of factor adjustment across each
margin. This extra flexibility alters rents, and as a consequence the incentives both to dissolve
existing matches and to create new ones. Labour adjustment on the extensive margin is attenuated
and the tendency to synchronise creation and destruction activity is also reduced.7 One potential
problem is that variation on the intensive margin may substitute for variation on the extensive
margin and attenuate fluctuations in unemployment - worsening the volatility puzzle highlighted
by Shimer (2005). In practice, holding other parameters constant, the eﬀect on unemployment is
relatively small. In addition, our calibration strategy adjusts parameters to maintain the standard
deviation of job destruction constant across experiments, so that unemployment variation remains
roughly constant regardless of the use of the intensive margin. However, the volatility of job
creation and vacancies is reduced by realistic hours variation.
The sensitivity of reallocative measures to variation in hours is enhanced by the presence of
monetary shocks. It is costly to dissolve existing matches or create new matches in response to
transitory shocks, yet hours variation within existing matches does not entail long-run consider-
ations. Since monetary shocks are less persistent than productivity shocks, the introduction of
hours variation has its greatest eﬀect on the response to monetary shocks. Nonetheless, even for
productivity shocks, realistic hours variation alters the incentives for intertemporal substitution
suﬃciently to produce a negative job flows correlation.
A small collection of papers incorporate endogenous separations into the New Keynesian treat-
ment of unemployment, Krause and Lubik (2007), Trigari (2005), Braun (2006), Walsh (2005),
Andres et al. (2006). These authors all provide the same rationale and broadly address the same
issues as considered in the literature which assumes a constant separation rate (see footnotes (1)
and (2)). For the most part, they do not address questions on the timing of reallocation that we
consider and that a model with endogenous job destruction is designed to answer. In particular,
the joint behaviour of the Beveridge curve and the correlation of gross job flows is considered
only by Krause and Lubik (2007), who find both measures of reallocation to be positive, in an
7 With the intensive margin suppressed, a rise in unemployment occurs through a rise in job creation and an even
bigger rise in job destruction. This reflects the relatively low cost of altering the rate of job destruction (relative
to that of job creation). It gives rise to a (counterfactual) positive correlation of job creation and job destruction.
Since job creation tends also to be high when the number of vacancies open is high, the Beveridge curve is flatter
and may become positive in the absence of hours variation.
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environment with endogenous job destruction and labour input variation on the extensive margin
only.8
The combination of endogenous hours along with endogenous job destruction that we discuss
below was first considered by Trigari (2005). Our principal contribution is to demonstrate the
eﬀect of realistic hours variation on measures of reallocative activity. We also illustrate the role
of diﬀerent shocks in determining the eﬀect of hours variation on reallocation. Trigari does not
directly consider the correlation of gross job flows, nor does she attempt to match the behaviour
of unemployment or vacancies. Nonetheless her impulse response analysis is likely to be consistent
with the eﬀects of hours variation on reallocation that we outline here.9 We use a simplified version
of Trigari’s model and use it to contrast the behaviour of measures of reallocation obtained under
diﬀerent assumptions about labour supply elasticity. Our focus on contrasting the impact of
particular (implicit) assumptions on hours variation in a relatively simple New Keynesian model
leads us to calibrate rather than estimating the elasticity of hours directly. It also means that we
take a stand on the shocks that aﬀect the economy and match unconditional moments. Although
not imune from criticism this strategy faciltates comparison with Krause and Lubik (2007) and
Walsh (2005); Trigari (2005) considers the (conditional) response to monetary shocks alone.10
Of the other three papers, Walsh (2005) was the first to integrate New Keynesian model with
labour market search and endogenous job destruction. Following from Den Haan et al. he does not
allow variation in hours per worker and does not consider measures of reallocation at all. Andres et
al. (2006) extend Walsh’s model and use it to examine the variability of unemployment, vacancies
and labour market tightness.11 Although they do not compute the slope of the Beveridge curve,
it can be inferred from the results they present. For the version of their model (without capital
and distortionary taxation) which most closely approximates ours, it is -0.08: negative but much
smaller than in US data, just as we find when we suppress variation in hours. They do not display
8 They find that the introduction of (complete) wage rigidity can produce a downward-sloping Beveridge curve,
but they are unable to avoid positively correlated gross job flows. Indeed, they are unable to match the Beveridge
curve if wage rigidity is set to match observed wage variability.
9 Trigari (2005) estimates key parameters so as to match the impulse responses of job flows, employment, hours
inflation and output to an interest rate shock.
10In principle one might then estimate the model using a Bayesian approach, as in the treatment of a model with
exogenous job destruction provided by Jung and Kuester (2007). However, our calibration suggests that the present
model is too simple to be taken to the data in this way, so we leave this for future work.
11Their benchmark model also allows for habit persistence, capital accumulation and distortionary taxes.
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any data for the volatility of gross job flows or related measures of reallocation.12 Our analysis
suggests that because they suppress variation in hours per worker the correlation of gross job flows
would be positive but that this can be corrected by allowing hours variation. Andres et al. (2006)
find a role for price rigidity in determining the variability of unemployment vacancies and labour
market tightness. Our analysis extends theirs to an environment in which hours per worker can
both vary and allows for monetary as well as productivity shocks. Braun (2006) applies Trigari’s
methodology to worker flows rather than job flows; she considers a New Keynesian framework
with capital accumulation.
We consider a New Keynesian model without capital accumulation. While capital can help dis-
cipline model calibration, much work in the New Keynesian tradition both for structural modelling
and policy analysis suppresses this margin, see Gali (2003), Woodford (2003), as do models with
unemployment, Blanchard and Gali (2006), Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005), Faia (2007a), Trigari
(2006). The main justification (often implicit) for this simplification appears to be the limited role
played by capital accumulation.13 The omission of capital accumulation and other intertemporal
features, such as habit persistence, serves to highlight the role of the intensive margin.14
The model is outlined in Section 2. Calibration and solution method are discussed in Section
3. Section 4 presents and discusses the results and assess the contribution of various features in
accounting for US business cycles facts. Section 5 concludes. An appendix contains details of the
data used, and the calibration strategy.
2 Model
The economy contains four types of agent: intermediate good producers, final goods producers,
households and a government. Production of the intermediate good requires labour. Labour can
12In addition, direct comparison between our results and those of Andres et al. (2006) is complicated by the fact that
they appear only to calibrate idiosyncratic shocks and the properties of the productivity shock in the benchmark
case, and proceed to allow the variability of job destruction and output to vary across experiments.
13In the literature on unemployment dynamics, Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005) point out that match-level profits
are an important determinant of the amplitude of fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies. Krussell et al.
(2005), surveying developments in the literature, comment that the calibration of this critical profit share parameter
could be improved if capital accumulation were incorporated as a disciplining device, but Jung (2005) demonstrates
that the introduction of capital accumulation does not overturn the insight of Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005).
14An earlier version of this paper, Holt (2006), adopted a framework with capital accumulation. The results on
the role of hours variation are similar to those displayed below. Hence a New Keynesian environment capital
accumulation does not alter incentives suﬃciently to generate a negative job flows correlation, contrary to the real
business cycle based analysis of Den Haan et al (2000).
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be varied on both extensive and intensive margins. Hours are determined through Nash bargaining
rather than unilaterally by individual consumers. The strength of variation on the intensive margin
is determined by the elasticity of labour supply (preferences over leisure). The model structure is
based on that of Trigari (2005). We simplify her model in several ways in order to highligt the
role of hours variation and facilitate comparison with the literature. We omit habit persistence to
simplify the dynamic structure of the model and thereby highlight the role of hours. We target
the BLS estmate of average unemployment (6%) rather than the high (25%) unemployment she
uses, which acts to stabilise the unemployment pool and hence vacancies in response to shocks.
In the light of evidence of instability of the Taylor rule over the sample period we follow Krause
and Lubik (2007) and adopt a money supply growth rule. We also adopt idiosyncratic production
costs rather than idiosyncratic preference shocks, which is slightly more intuitive in the light of our
interest in reallocation based on profitability. Finally we specify preferences over leisure, following
Andolfatto (1995) rather than hours worked as is common in the New Keynesian literature.
Below we discuss in turn the decision problem of households, the specification of goods and
labour markets and the equilibrium characterisation of the economy.
2.1 Households
Assume that the economy contains a continuum of identical households of unit mass. Each house-
hold is a family with a continuum of members. In equilibrium some members are employed while
others are unemployed. Each member i, of household h has the following period utility function
defined over consumption, C, money balances MP and hours,H,¡
Chi,t
¢1−φ
1− φ +
ΥM
P
1− ξ
Ã
Mhi,t
Pt
!1−ξ
+
¡
1− IUt
¢
ΥH
¡
1−Hhi,t
¢1−ϕ
1− ϕ + I
U
t
(1− e)1−ϕ
1− ϕ
Here ΥM
P
, the relative weight on money balances in the utility function, ΥH , the relative weight on
leisure in the utility function, φ, the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ϕ, the
elasticity of substitution of hours per worker, e time spent undertaking search and ξ are all positive
constants. IUt is an indicator function taking the value 1 if the individual is unemployed and zero
otherwise. To avoid the distributional issues that arise through diﬀering employment histories, we
assume that family members perfectly insure each other against (cross-section) variation in the
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marginal utility of consumption. Separability of the individual’s utility in consumption, money
balances and leisure ensures that family members have identical consumption and money holdings.
Under these simplifying assumptions, household member’s decisions can be analysed in terms
of a representative household.15 The representative household chooses consumption and money
balances to maximise expected utility of its members over their lifetimes:
E0
"X
t=0
βt
"
(Ct)
1−φ
1− φ +
ΥM
P
1− ξ
µ
Mt
Pt
¶1−ξ
+ΥH
Z 1−Ut
0
(1−Hi,t)1−ϕ
1− ϕ di+ Ut
(1− e)1−ϕ
1− ϕ
##
.
Here β, is the discount factor and Ut represents the fraction of the household membership which
is unemployed (we suppress the household superscript for convenience). Hours of work are deter-
mined through bargaining between the individual worker and the firm rather than being unilater-
ally determined by the household.
Households own all retail and wholesale firms. They can save by holding 1-period interest
bearing bonds, or non-interest bearing money balances. The representative household maximises
expected lifetime utility subject to the following sequence of constraints
PtCt +Rnt Bt +Mt = It +Bt +Mt−1 + PtTt, t ≥ 0. (1)
Here Bt represents holdings of a nominal 1 period bond, and Rnt represents the gross nominal
interest rate on this bond. Mt represents holdings of nominal money balances at the end of period
t, PtTt represents lump-sum nominal transfers. Ct is a composite index of final goods consumption.
It is the household’s nominal income (household labour income, plus the household’s share of firms’
profits net of expenditures on vacancies).16
The solution to the representative household’s problem is characterised by first-order conditions
for bond holdings, Bt, consumption Ct, money balances Mt. Substituting the first order condi-
tion for the shadow value of wealth using the marginal utility of consumption in the remaining
conditions we have:
1 = βRnt Et
"
Pt
Pt+1
µ
Ct
Ct+1
¶φ#
. (2)
15This sort of assumption is a common simplification in the literature on business cycle fluctuations under labour
market search designed to facilitate tractability, see e.g. Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995).
16Given the representative family assumption, all families hold the same share of firms’ profits, so in equilibrium
this share is one at all dates.
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ΥM
P
µ
Mt
Pt
¶−ξ
− C−φt = βEt
∙
C−φt+1
Pt+1
Pt
¸
(3)
2.2 Goods and Labour Markets
2.2.1 Labour Market Flows
The match specific production, bargaining and separation decisions described below depend on
the probability that unemployed workers find jobs and the probability that vacancies are filled.
Here we define these probabilities and the associated labour market flows.
Define the number of matches at the beginning of period t as Nt ∈ [0, 1]. Following the
literature, we allow some job destruction in the form of quits which are taken as exogenous and
independent of the match-specific profitability. We capture this by allowing a fraction, λx, of
matches to separate prior to the realisation of period t shocks. Subsequently, shocks are realised,
including an idiosyncratic cost shock, X, drawn from distribution F (X) and a match may choose
to break up if the value of the match surplus is negative. Let the X¯t denote the threshold value
of the cost shock, so that higher realisations of idiosyncratic costs cause matches to separate.
Endogenous separation thus occurs with probability λn
¡
X¯t
¢
= 1 −
R X¯t dF (X) = 1 − F ¡X¯t¢,
where dF (·) is the probability density function over X. The overall separation rate in period t is
λt = λ
x + (1− λx)
¡
1− F
¡
X¯t
¢¢
. (4)
We model matching frictions using an aggregate matching function. Matching occurs at the
same time as production. Assume that there is a continuum of potential firms, with infinite mass,
and a continuum of workers of unit mass. Unmatched firms choose whether or not to post a
vacancy and incur a cost κ per period. Free entry of unmatched firms determines the size of
the vacancy pool. Define the mass of firms posting vacancies in period t as Vt. Let the mass of
searchers, unmatched workers, be Ut. All unmatched workers may enter the matching market in
period t - even if their match dissolved at the start of period t, so
Ut = 1− (1− λt)Nt. (5)
New matches in date t begin production in date t + 1, while unmatched workers remain in the
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worker matching pool. The flow of successful matches created in period t is given by the constant
returns matching function
Mt =MUγt V 1−γt . (6)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) and M > 0. The number of employed workers at the start of period t+ 1 is
Nt+1 = (1− λt)Nt +Mt. (7)
Denote the probability that a vacancy is filled in date t as
pVt =
Mt
Vt
, (8)
and the probability that an unemployed worker enters employment in period t as
pUt =
Mt
Ut
. (9)
The gross job destruction rate is the number employment relationships that separate less exogenous
separations that rematch within period as a fraction of current employment
JDt =
λtNt − pVt λxNt
Nt
= λt − pVt λx. (10)
Gross job creation is the flow of new matches (as a fraction of existing employment) less matches
due to firms filling vacancies that resulted from exogenous separations
JCt =
Mt − pVt λxNt
Nt
=
Mt
Nt
− pVt λx. (11)
2.2.2 The Intermediate sector
Production Production of intermediate goods takes place in matched firm-worker pairs - or, for
notational ease, matches. Each match consists of one worker and one firm, who together engage
in production until the employment relationship is terminated. By assumption, both firms and
workers are restricted to a single employment relationship at any given time. Matches are subject
to aggregate productivity and idiosyncratic cost shocks, Zt and Xt respectively.17 Following Den
Haan et al. (2000) assume that idiosyncratic cost disturbances are serially uncorrelated. Date t
17Cost shocks are a natural way to model heterogenous productivity underlying the process of creative destruction
at the heart of the model. Trigari (2005) adopts an formally equivalent but arguably less intuitive approach in
which the idiosyncratic disturbances aﬀect the utility derived from leisure.
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production occurs after realisation of the date t shocks. At date t an ongoing match (one facing
idiosyncratic shock Xt < X¯t) produces
Y I (Xt) = AZtH (Xt) + F −Xt
units of intermediate good.18 The parameters A and F are positive constants. Matches are
price takers and sell their homogeneous intermediate output at (nominal) price P It . The formal
separation of the job-destruction and price-setting decision problems is maintained for tractability,
but is consistent with the view that prices are not set at the level of an individual match. Current
profits of an ongoing match are
ΠI (Xt) ≡
AZtH (Xt)
µt
+
F −Xt
µt
− W (Xt)H (Xt)
Pt
, (12)
where µt =
Pt
P It
is the markup of the index of final goods prices over the price of the intermediate
good (the reciprocal of marginal cost) and W (Xt) is the match specific (nominal) wage.
Value Functions Next we describe the value functions for firms’ and workers’ decision problems.
In equation (13) V Ut , the date t value of unemployment, expressed in final goods, comprises the
consumption value of utility from search, the discounted present value of ongoing unemployment
next period, V Ut+1, and the diﬀerence between the value of employment, V
W (X), and that of
unemployment in the event that the worker matches this period (with probability pUt ) and the
match survives to produce next period (with probability (1− λx)F
¡
X¯t+1
¢
):
V Ut =
(1− e)1−ϕ
1− ϕ C
φ
t + βEt
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
"
V Ut+1 + p
U
t (1− λx)
Z X¯t+1 £
VW (X)− V Ut+1
¤
dF (X)
##
. (13)
Matching and production occur simultaneously, so that a match which is formed in period t cannot
produce until period t+1, after aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks have been realised. As a result
a new match survives with probability (1− λx)F
¡
X¯t+1
¢
.
Let VW (Xt) denote the date t value, expressed in terms of consumption goods, to a worker of
employment in an ongoing match with idiosyncratic cost shock Xt.
VW (Xt) =
W (Xt)H (Xt)
Pt
+ΥH
(1−H (Xt))1−ϕ
1− ϕ C
φ
t
+βEt
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
"
V Ut+1 + (1− λx)
Z X¯t+1 £
VW (X)− V Ut+1
¤
dF (X)
##
. (14)
18An additive idiosyncratic shock avoids wide variation of hours across matches, Cooley and Quadrini (1999).
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The worker supplies H (Xt) hours of labour to the firm for real hourly wage
W (Xt)
Pt
. Both wage and
hours are outcomes of a bargaining process - described below. Hours worked generates income,
but hours spent in the workplace reduce utility. These concerns are captured in the first two terms
in (14). The remainder of the date t value to an employed worker from the ongoing match is
the discounted present value, βEt
∙
Cφt
Cφt+1
V Ut+1
¸
, of unemployment plus the diﬀerence between the
value of employment, VW (X), and that of unemployment in the event that the match continues
to produce next period (where we sum across values of X which do not lead to termination prior
to date t+ 1 production).
The date t value, V J (Xt), of a firm that forms part of an ongoing match with current match
specific shock Xt, consists of current profits plus the appropriately discounted value to the firm of
the sum of a date t+ 1 vacancy, V Vt+1, in the event that the match terminates prior to production
in period t+ 1 (where termination occurs with probability λt+1 = λ
x + (1− λx)
¡
1− F
¡
X¯t+1
¢¢
)
and the expected value in the event that the match continues to produce in t+ 1;
V J (Xt) = Π
I (Xt) + βEt
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
"
λt+1V
V
t+1 + (1− λx)
Z X¯t+1
V J (X) dF (X)
##
.
We assume vacancy posting costs κ per period. Then the value in date t of a firm with an unfilled
vacancy, V Vt , reflects the cost of posting that vacancy plus the value of firm, V
V
t+1, in the event
that the firm fails to fill the vacancy by date t+ 1 or else the event that the vacancy is filled but
the match is terminated prior to production in period t+ 1 (this occurs for a suﬃciently adverse
realisation of the idiosyncratic shock), plus the value V J (X) in the event that the vacancy is filled
and the period t+ 1 idiosyncratic cost shock takes a value X, that does not lead to termination
V Vt = −κ+ βEt
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
"¡
1− pVt (1− λx)F
¡
X¯t+1
¢¢
V Vt+1 + p
V
t (1− λx)
Z X¯t+1
V J (X) dF (X)
##
.
The free entry condition on vacancies drives the value of a vacancy to zero, V Vt = 0, ∀t, so the
Bellman equations for V J (Xt), and V Vt become
V J (Xt) = Π
I (Xt) + (1− λx)βEt
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
Z X¯t+1
V J (X) dF (X)
#
(15)
κ = pVt (1− λx)βEt
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
Z X¯t+1
V J (X) dF (X)
#
. (16)
11
Job Reallocation, Unemployment and Hours in a New Keynesian Model
Moreover, using (15), we can re-write (16) as a Bellman equation for pVt :
κ
pVt
= β (1− λx)Et
"
Cφt
Cφt+1
Z X¯t+1 ∙
ΠI (X) +
κ
pVt+1
¸
dF (X)
#
. (17)
Bargaining: Hours and Wages We assume that for each match engaged in production, the
firm and worker adopt Nash bargaining over hours worked and the hourly wage. Given the full
consumption insurance against unemployment risk provided by our family structure some care is
required to ensure that this problem is well defined. We discuss this issue first before turning to
the outcome of the bargaining process.
Assume that workers evaluate the consequences of their actions on the basis of the contribu-
tions these make to their family’s lifetime utility. Then the worker’s surplus from employment,
VW (Xt) − V Ut is the same as the value (in terms of consumption goods) of the change in the
family’s utility from having one more additional member in employment, ∂Ωt∂(1−Ut) · C
φ
t . That is
VW (Xt) − V Ut = ∂Ωt∂(1−Ut) · C
φ
t , where Ωt is the representative family’s value function. To check
this note that we can write Ωt recursively as
Ωt =
(Ct)
1−φ
1− φ +
ΥM
P
1− ξ
µ
Mt
Pt
¶1−ξ
+ΥH
Z 1−Ut
0
(1−H (Xi,t))1−ϕ
1− ϕ di+Ut
(1− e)1−ϕ
1− ϕ +βEt
£
Ωt+1|X ≤ X¯t+1
¤
subject to the date t constraint in (1), and the evolution equation for the number of individuals
engaged in production
1− Ut+1 = [1− λt+1] [1− Ut] + pUt [1− λt+1]Ut.
Computing the derivative with respect to (1− Ut) we find
∂Ωt
∂ (1− Ut)
· Cφt =
W (Xt)H(Xt)
Pt
−ΥH (1−H(Xt))
1−ϕ
1−ϕ C
φ
t +
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ C
φ
t
+
¡
1− pUt
¢
β (1− λx)Et
∙
Cφt
Cφt+1
R X¯t+1 £VW (X)− V Ut+1¤ dF (X)¸ .
Using equations (13) and (14) we find that this equals VW (Xt) − V Ut , as required. Thus the
worker’s threat point in the bargaining process is clearly defined in terms of household welfare.
Given that the bargaining problem for the worker is well defined, the division of the match
surplus
S (Xt) = VW (Xt)− V Ut + V J (Xt)− V Vt = VW (Xt)− V Ut + V J (Xt) , (18)
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is determined on a period by period basis as:
max
W (Xt),H(Xt)
£
VW (Xt)− V Ut
¤η £
V J (Xt)− V Vt+1
¤1−η
.
The first order conditions for hours and wages respectively are
ηV J (Xt)
"
W (Xt)
Pt
−ΥH
(1−H (Xt))−ϕ
C−φt
#
= −
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(1− η)
¡
VW (Xt)− V Ut
¢ ·h
AZt
µt
− W (Xt)Pt
i
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
, (19)
ηV J (Xt) = (1− η)
¡
VW (Xt)− V Ut
¢
. (20)
Optimal hours worked are thus
ΥH
(1−H (Xt))−ϕ
C−φt
= ΥH
(1−Ht)−ϕ
C−φt
=
AZt
µt
∀Xt ≤ X¯t. (21)
Equation (21) says that, under Nash bargaining, the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and hours worked is equal to the marginal product of labour. Hours per worker in ongoing
matches are decreasing in the markup, but increasing in aggregate productivity. Variation in hours
per worker is decreasing in ϕ, so choice of ϕ can be used to shut down the intensive margin in our
experiments. Hours per worker are independent of the match specific shock: H (Xt) = Ht.
Recall that the worker’s surplus from employment is
VW (Xt)− V Ut =
W (Xt)Ht
Pt
+ΥH
(1−Ht)1−ϕ
1−ϕ C
φ
t −
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ C
φ
t
+
¡
1− pUt
¢
β (1− λx)Et
∙
Cφt
Cφt+1
R X¯t+1 £VW (X)− V Ut+1¤ dF (X)¸ .
Using (20) and (16) it follows that
VW (Xt)− V Ut =
W (Xt)Ht
Pt
+ΥH
(1−Ht)1−ϕ
1− ϕ C
φ
t −
(1− e)1−ϕ
1− ϕ C
φ
t +
η
1− η
¡
1− pUt
¢ κ
pVt
.
Lastly, combining (15) and (16)
V J (Xt) =
AZtHt
µt
+
F −Xt
µt
− W (Xt)Ht
Pt
+
κ
pVt
.
So the optimal wage for a match with idiosyncratic cost realisation Xt becomes
W (Xt)Ht
Pt
= η
∙
AZtHt
µt
+
F −Xt
µt
+ κ
pUt
pVt
¸
+ (1− η)
"
(1− e)1−ϕ
1− ϕ C
φ
t −ΥH
(1−Ht)1−ϕ
1− ϕ C
φ
t
#
.
Define aggregate labour income as WtHtPt = Ht
R X¯t W (Xt)
Pt
dF (X). Then
WtHt
Pt
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
η
∙
AZtHt
µt
+ 1µt
∙
F −
U X¯t X dF (X)
F(X¯t)
¸
+ κ p
U
t
pVt
¸
+(1− η)
h
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ C
φ
t −ΥH
(1−Ht)1−ϕ
1−ϕ C
φ
t
i
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
F
¡
X¯t
¢
. (22)
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The first term within the first square brackets on the right hand side of equation (22) represents
the workers’ share of the market value of production, the second term reflects the market value
of idiosyncratic costs (relative to steady state), and the third term reflects the impact of labour
market tightness. The remaining term reflects the worker’s reservation wage.
Separation For values of the idiosyncratic cost shock above a certain threshold level, X¯t, sep-
aration occurs. The condition S
¡
X¯t
¢
= 0, pins down this threshold value of the match specific
shock. Combining (18) and (20), V J (Xt) = (1− η)S (Xt). So X¯t is determined by the condition
V J
¡
X¯t
¢
= 0 :
AZtHt
µt
+
F − X¯t
µt
−
W
¡
X¯t
¢
Ht
Pt
+
κ
pVt
= 0.
This equation indicates that a job is destroyed when costs are suﬃciently high that the value
of production net of idiosyncratic cost shock and wage equals the (expected) cost of posting a
vacancy. Substituting for the match specific wage, the threshold value X¯t is determined by
(1− η)
"
AZtHt
µt
+
F − X¯t
µt
−
"
(1− e)1−ϕ
1− ϕ C
φ
t −ΥH
(1−Ht)1−ϕ
1− ϕ C
φ
t
##
− ηκp
U
t
pVt
+
κ
pVt
= 0. (23)
2.2.3 Final Goods Sector
Assume that there is a continuum of final goods producers, with unit mass. Final good firm z
acquires the wholesale good at price P It and costlessly transforms it into the divisible final good z
which is then sold directly to households at price pt (z). Define Pt =
³R 1
0
pt (z)
1−ε dz
´ 1
1−ε
as the
utility based price index associated with the consumption composites. The market for final goods
is characterised by monopolistic competition - ε represents the elasticity of substitution across
varieties of final good. Aggregate demand for the final good z in period t is yt (z) = ct (z), where
ct (z) represents consumption demand for final good z output. The optimal choice of consumption
expenditures on final good z is then ct (z) =
³
pt(z)
Pt
´−ε
Ct, where aggregate consumption, Ct =³R 1
0
ct (z)
ε−1
ε dz
´ ε
1−ε
and aggregate final good output Yt =
³R 1
0
yt (z)
ε−1
ε dz
´ ε
1−ε
are composite
indices of final goods.
Final goods prices exhibit nominal rigidities which follow a hybrid Calvo-style adjustment
scheme. With probability (1− ω) a final good producer can set the price of its output in period
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t. This probability be independent of when the firm last adjusted price. Then the average price
for final goods producers who do not adjust their price is simply Pt−1. Define the average price
set by firms who do adjust price as p¯t. Since pure forward-looking price adjustment schemes seem
not to account adequately for observed inflation dynamics, we employ a hybrid scheme (following
Gali and Gertler (1999)). Assume that a fraction (1− τ) of the final goods producers are forward-
looking and set prices optimally (to maximise expected discounted profits given the probability of
future adjustment). Define the price set by forward-looking producer z at date t as pt (z). Since
all forward-looking firms setting price at date t face the same expected future demand and cost
conditions they choose the same price, so pt (z) = p∗t , where
p∗t =
ε
1− ε
Et
P∞
s=0 ω
sβs C
φ
t
Cφt+s
³
p∗t
Pt+s
´1−ε
Yt+sP It+s
Et
P∞
s=0 ω
sβs C
φ
t
Cφt+s
³
p∗t
Pt+s
´1−ε
Yt+s
(24)
The remaining fraction, τ , of firms which reset price in period t are assumed to set a price equal
to the average of the prices reset in the previous period, corrected for inflation, πt−1:
pbt = p¯t−1πt−1. (25)
The average price set in period t is pt =
h
(1− τ) (p∗t )
1−ε + τ
¡
pbt−1
¢1−εi 11−ε
, and the aggregate
retail price index evolves according to
P 1−εt = (1− ω) (p¯t)
1−ε + ωP 1−εt−1 . (26)
2.3 Monetary and Fiscal Policy and Exogenous Driving Processes
We set government spending to zero and assume that the government maintains a balanced budget
by rebating seigniorage revenues to households in the form of lump-sum transfers. The government
budget constraint is thus PtTt = Mt −Mt−1,where Mt is the aggregate money stock. Monetary
policy is specifed by
Mt =Mt−1e
υt (27)
where υt evolve according to the AR(1) process
υt = ρυυt−1 + ευ,t. (28)
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The logarithm of aggregate productivity also follows an AR(1) process:
lnZt = ρZ lnZt−1 + εZ,t (29)
where εν,t and εZ,t are independent mean zero processes.
2.4 Equilibrium
Under the representative consumer framework, household choices (superscript h) are common
across householdsand in equilibrium Mht =Mt etc, in (1) to (3). Aggregate income, It comprises
labour income, plus profits of final goods producers, plus profits of intermediate goods producers
net of vacancy posting costs It = (1− λx)NtWtHt + PtΠFt + PtΠIt . Here, nominal final goods
profits are PtΠFt =
R
pt (z) yt (z) dz − P It
R
yt (z) dz = PtYt − P It Y It , and
Y It = (1− λx)Nt
Z X¯t
0
[AZtHt + F −X] dF (X)− κµtVt (30)
denotes aggregate intermediate output net of vacancy posting costs.19 Nominal intermediate good
producers’ profit can be written as the sum of output net of vacancy costs, less aggregate wage
payments: PtΠIt = P
I
t Y
I
t − (1− λx)NtWtHt. Using these insights and cancelling terms we find
It = PtYt. In equilibrium, when combined with the government budget identity, the household
budget constraint reduces to the aggregate (final) goods market equilibrium condition
Yt = Ct (31)
Thus the system of equations governing equilibrium in the economy consists of the numbered
equations (1) - (12), (17) and (21) - (31).
3 Calibration & Model Solution Method
We log-linearise the model about its (zero-inflation, zero growth) steady state and use dynamic
simulations to tease out the dynamic structure of the economy. Model solution requires choice of
several parameters governing steady state values of labour and goods market variables; nominal
rigidity, and household preferences. We also specify the processes governing idiosyncratic costs,
19Note Y It =
U 1
0 yt (z) dz. Using the demand function for final good z: yt (z) =

pt(z)
Pt
−ε
Yt, we have Y It =
U 1
0

pt(z)
Pt
−ε
Ytdz =

Pt
P˜t
ε
Yt, where P˜t =
U 1
0 pt (z)
−ε dz, is an auxilliary price index.
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aggregate productivity and money supply growth. The parameter values are summarised in Table
1, Appendix A contains discussion of the rationale for these choices.
Table (1) here.
4 Results
In this section we discuss evidence on the impact of variation in hours per worker on the strength
and timing of reallocative activity and on other standard macroeconomic aggregates.
We contrast the behaviour of a model variant in which hours variation is suppressed (which
represents the standard approach in models of labour market search with endogenous job destruc-
tion) with an equivalent set up in which the elasticity of labour supply, governed by the parameter
ψ, is selected to match the variation of hours in the data. To provide a fair basis of comparison
across variants of the model, we hold constant across experiments both the standard deviation of
simulated output and the standard deviation of simulated job destruction relative to simulated
output. To do this, we adjust the standard deviation of productivity shocks to allow the standard
deviation of (Hodrick-Prescott filtered) model output to match the variability of output in US
data (Hodrick-Prescott filtered US NIPA GDP), which is 1.69%. We hold the autocorrelation of
productivity shocks, both standard deviation and serial correlation of money supply growth shocks
constant across these experiments. The standard deviation of idiosyncratic cost shocks is varied in
order to match the volatility of job destruction relative to that of GDP. These dimensions cannot
be used for falsification. Instead, we examine the ability of the model to capture two key aspects
of the strength and timing of reallocative behaviour: i) the Beveridge curve and ii) the correla-
tion of gross job flows. We also consider the operation of the labour market as captured by the
correlation of hours with employment, the behaviour of job creation and vacancies and standard
macroeconomic aggregates such as unemployment and inflation. We explain the mechanism by
which variation in hours per worker improves the treatment of labour reallocation, consider the
role played by diﬀerent shocks and examine the robustness of the results to plausible variation in
labour supply elasticity.
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4.1 Reallocation and Hours Variation
Table (2) illustrates the role of labour supply elasticity (variation in hours) in determining the
nature of reallocation. Column (1) of Table (2) displays properties of US Data. The other columns
of Table (2) correspond to a particular model variant.20 For column (X >1), the entry in the row
labelled output indicates the variability of output in column (X) relative to the variability of output
in US data. The other entries in column (X) (except the final 8) correspond to the variability
relative to that of output generated by model (X). The final two entries in each column are
serial correlation statistics for output and inflation, while the penultimate six entries are simple
correlation statistics capturing aspects of labour market activity.
Table (2) here.
Labour supply elasticity, H , is 1ψ
£
1−H
H
¤
= 2ψ , since in steady state H = 1/3. In the limit as
ψ → ∞, H → 0, and variation in hours is eliminated. Column (2) reports results for the model
where labour supply elasticity is set to a low value, 0.01, using ψ = 200. This suppresses hours
variation allowing our model to approximate the framework used by Krause and Lubik (2007).
Column (5) displays simulation results when labour supply elasticity is set to match the variability
of hours observed in US data. This enables our model to approximate the model of Trigari (2005).
The other columns are discussed in Section (4.3).
Without hours variation it is not possible to generate the patterns of reallocation found in
the data. The Beveridge curve is almost flat and the correlation of gross job flows is positive.
This mirrors the finding of Krause and Lubik (2007). This is exactly the eﬀect that one would
expect, in the light of the wider literature on reallocation under socially eﬃcient search, Mortensen
and Pissarides (1993).21 Once realistic variation in hours is permitted the model is much better
able to capture the direction of reallocation. However, the strength of the relationship between
unemployment and vacancies is not captured as the Beveridge curve, while downward sloping, is
20All statistics (for model simulations and data) are computed from Hodrick-Prescott filtered data, expressed as
percentage deviations from steady state (or trend in the case of the data). The business cycle statistics for model
variants are computed by averaging across 200 simulations. Each simulation contains 250 data points but the first
50 are omitted when undertaking detrending and computing moments.
21It appears to confirm the diﬃculties of allowing for endogenous job destruction outlined by Shimer (2005) even
though here movements in job destruction are driven by aggregate productivity and monetary disturbances rather
than the reallocative shocks to exogenous job destruction that he discusses.
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not as steep as that in the data, see Columns (1), (2) and (5).
It is worth spending some time trying to understand the mechanism by which variation in
hours alters the incentives to create and destroy jobs. To do so we contrast the model’s response
to a shock that raises unemployment under inelastic hours and then under elastic hours.
First notice that from an accounting viewpoint, a rise in unemployment can be achieved in a
variety of ways including a rise in job destruction and a fall in job creation, or by one of these in
isolation with no change in the other, by a fall in job creation combined with a smaller fall in job
destruction or even by a rise in job creation combined with a larger rise in job destruction. The
first of these would tend to give rise to a negative contemporaneous correlation of job creation and
job destruction. The first case describes the data, as is well documented Davis et al. (1998). It
also applies to the case with elastic hours. The first case describes the data, as is well documented
Davis et al. (1998). It also applies to the case with elastic hours. The last (two) of cases would tend
to produce a positive contemporaneous correlation of job creation with job destruction. Under
inelastic hours a rise in unemployment occurs through a rise in job creation combined with a
larger rise in job destruction. Second, since the correlation of gross job flows is a flow measure of
reallocation while the Beveidge curve is (at least in part) is a stock measure, it is not clear that
there should be a strong association between the correlation of gross job flows and the slope of the
Beveridge curve. The relationship between the two will depend on the extent to which high levels
of vacancies are strongly associated with periods of above average job creation and to the extent
that above average job destruction is associated with periods of above average unemployment.
Consider the case where variation in hours is suppressed. Separations are eﬃcient and job
destruction facilitates the socially eﬃcient creation of jobs, so the optimal time to create jobs is
at the point at which the opportunity cost of doing so is at its lowest, namely when match level
profits (rents) are low. This makes job creation and job destruction move together, Column (2). As
Column (2) shows, job creation and vacancies also move together very closely with hours variation
suppressed - whereas in US data these variables appear virtually uncorrelated, so a decline in rents
for ongoing matches (following a shock) drives up job destruction, which is positively correlated
with unemployment, although the correlation is weaker than in US data. Such a shock also
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leads to a sharp rise in job creation, which is strongly associated with a rise in vacancies. So
with hours variation suppressed unemployment and vacancies are less strongly associated than
in the data because in the model job destruction is relatively weakly associated with changes in
unemployment, despite the strong correlation of vacancies with job creation, and of job creation
with job destruction. This demonstraes the diﬃculties of accounting for reallocative behaviour
under the standard (implicit) assumption that labour input can only be varied on the extensive
margin. It also provides and example of an environment in which the correlation of gross flows
takes a diﬀerent sign to the slope of the Beveridge curve.
Next consider the environment in which ψ is set to match the variability of hours in US data,
σH/σY (to achieve this we set ψ = 2.25 as in Column (5)). With realistic variation in hours,
the model generates a positive correlation between hours per worker and employment (albeit
weaker than that in the data). So hours per worker will be above average in an expansion, as
unemployment rises, and below average in a recession as unemployment falls. Variation in hours
per worker reduces the extent to which rents vary in response to shocks (as a result of the convexity
of the match level rents in hours per worker.
Increased variation in hours per worker is likely to reduce the variation on the extensive margin.
The response of job destruction to shocks will, other things equal, be more muted when hours can
vary and insulate the economy from the full reallocative eﬀects of any shock. As a direct result of
this reduced response of job destruction, the incentives for vacancy and job creation (in response
to a shock that raises unemployment) will be attenuated for two reasons. Firstly, the reduced
response of job destruction will leave a larger number of ongoing matches, which will reduce
the potential rents available to new matches and consequently reduce job creation and vacancy
creation. Secondly the response of job creation will be attenuated because the probability of filling
an open vacancy will fall, due to the reduction in the size of the pool of unemployed workers (which
follows from the more muted response of job destruction). Finally the job creation response is
likely to be attenuated, independently of any variation in job destruction, since the flexibility of
hours allows ongoing matches to respond to improved conditions (as the economy moves back
towards steady state following a shock).
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Now, in practice, our calibration strategy holds the variability of job destruction constant across
experiments at the value observed in US data, σJD/σY . This places greater emphasis on the final
eﬀect described in the previous paragraph. Columns (2) and (5) confirm that greater elasticity
of hours reduces the variability of job creation as would be expected under the latter eﬀect. By
attenuating the use of the extensive margin (job creation) in response to shocks, hours variation
alters the correlation of gross job flows. So, in response to a shock that leads to an increase in
unemployment, job creation rises when job destruction falls, as in the data, despite the fact that we
require the economy to satisfy the Hosios condition. Vacancies are less variable when variation in
hours is introduced which is consistent with the idea that variation in hours attenuates use of the
extensive margin. Vacancies remain positively correlated with job creation when hours can vary
(Column (5)) but the correlation is weaker than with hours variation suppressed (Column (2)). By
contrast, the correlation of job destruction with unemployment is stronger under the variable hours
environment than with hours variation suppressed. It is the combination of the stronger correlation
between job destruction and unemployment, and the reduction in the correlation of job creation
with vacancies that permits the negative correlation of job creation and job destruction together
with a negatively sloped Beveridge curve. Although, the Beveridge curve remains shallower than
required by the data.
While a model with hours variation oﬀers an improved treatment of many aspects of realloca-
tion, the joint behaviour of vacancies with job creation is one area in which the variation of hours
does not really get close to the data. In US data there is virtually no relationship between the job
creation and the number of open vacancies, yet with realistic hours variation the model generates
a positive correlation between vacancies and job creation (the association is even greater when
hours variation is suppressed). This reflects the lack of persistence in vacancies (not displayed in
Table (2)): in US data the first order serial correlation coeﬃcient for vacancies is 0.92, while in
the model with hours variation it takes the value 0.08.
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4.2 Hours Variation and Other Macroeconomic Aggregates
It is important to ensure that the improvement in the account of reallocative activity provided
by the model does not compromise other aspects of model performance. Here we provide a
brief summary of the other properties of the model. As indicated in the introduction, some of
these issues have been discussed by Trigari (2005) for the model with elastic hours variation and
Walsh (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007) and Andres et al. (2006) for the case where variation is
suppressed. As a result, rather than repeat their detailed analysis of the mechanisms present, we
highlight the impact of hours variation and the behaviour of aspects of the model that are not
considered elsewhere. In particular, we discuss the impact of variable hours on the volatility of
unemployment, vacancies and labour market tightness as the behaviour of these variables was not
explicitly considered by Trigari (2005).22
In contrast to the results of Shimer (2005) (who finds that the volatility of unemployment is
only one tenth of that in US data), we find that the model generates unemployment volatility that
is around 80% of that in the data. This is true regardless of the elasticity of hours per worker.
Andres et al. (2006) argue that this mainly reflects the presence of nominal rigidities in the New
Keynesian model. If one were to hold the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks (and other
parameters) constant (rather than adjusting parameters to hold the standard deviation of job
destruction constant), then as Walsh (2005) notes an increase in nominal price setting frictions
raises the amplitude and persistence of output fluctuations. Put simply the introduction of noinal
rigidities flattens the supply curve and raises the output response to shocks at the expense of
price adjustment. Since the volatility of unemployment will increase with that of output it follows
that unemployment will exhibit greater volatility. This explains the impact of price stickiness on
unemployment poited out by Andres et al. (2006). However, in their analysis i) the standard
22Trigari (2005) and Walsh (2005) discuss the role of labour market search and matching frictions in enhancing the
persistence of inflation and output in response to shocks (compared to a standard New Keynesian framework with
a frictionless Walrasian labour market). Trigari (2005) outlines the impact of variation on the extensive margin
for the behaviour of marginal cost, while Walsh (2005) demonstrates that output and inflation persistence can be
enhanced by the introduction of habit persistence in consumption and by increasing the strength of frictions in
nominal price setting using a hybid Calvo price-setting scheme. Krause and Lubik (2007) provide evidence that the
unemployment-vacancy-tightness variability puzzle identified by Shimer (2005) can be resolved by incorporating
real wage rigidity through an ad hoc wage norm. Andres et al. (2006) argue that (in conjunction with habit
persistence in consumption, capital accumulation and distortionary taxation) the frictions in price setting in a New
Keynesian model make it possible to solve the unemployment - vacancy - tightness variability puzzle without resort
to either wage rigidity, as in Shimer (2005), or departures fron the Hosios condition as in Hagedorn and Manowskii
(2005).
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deviation of output varies across experiments and ii) the standard deviation of job flows appears
to be calibrated only in the benchmark case so that it too can vary across experiments. So this
mechanism can not explain the somewhat surprising rise in unemployment volatility as variation in
hours is introduced in our model (see Columns (2) and (5)), since both output and job destruction
variability are held constant across our experiments. Instead the change in unemployment reflects
the fact that unemployment is less strongly correlated with job destruction in the latter case, while
the volatility of job destruction is held constant across experiments. The decline in the use of the
extensive margin that we anticipate associated with the introduction of variable hours therefore
shows up as a reduction in the volatility of vacancies (and also in the volatility of job creation).
The volatility of labour market tightness is unaﬀected. These results suggest that, if we insist
on adjusting parametrs to hold the volatility of job destruction constant, there may be some role
for more standard resolutions of the unemployment-vacancies-tightness puzzle: wage rigidity and
departures from the Hosios condition in matching these moments.
The serial correlation properties of output is not greatly aﬀected by the introduction of hours
variation and is close to its value in US data. Model-based inflation displays greater persistence
than US data once realistic hours variation is admitted. The variability of inflation is closer to the
value in US data when hours per worker can exhibit realistic variation than when this is suppressed.
To understand the variability of inflation, notice that the first order condition for optimal hours
equation (21) is common across experiments (since we do not suppress hours variation completely,
we only approximate the standard inelastic hours case):
ΥH
(1−Ht)−ϕ
C−φt
=
AZt
µt
This can be rearranged to give an expression for marginal cost = µ−1t , as a function of hours worked
(consumption and productivity). Given our assumptions on the structure of price adjustment,
inflation depends on the discounted present value of future marginal costs. In the inelastic case,
ψ = 200, so even though hours do not vary a great deal, the size of ψ makes marginal cost and
hence inflation sensitive to small variation in hours. This leads inflation to be more variable with
hours variation suppressed. The same is true for wages. The wage equation reflects variation in
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µ−1t as well as an eﬀect through the term in the disutility of hours worked (1−Ht)
1−ϕ which
again exhibits substantial variation for high values of ψ. However, even with elastic variation in
hours per worker, wages are three times more variable than in the data. This may leave scope for
the introduction of wage rigidity.
Overall, regardless of whether realistic variation in hours per worker is introduced, the extent
of variation on the extensive margin is insuﬃcient to account for the puzzles identified by Shimer
(2005). Nonetheless, the New Keynesian framework, even without capital, oﬀers a substantial
improvement in the account of unemployment volatility, and this is robust to the introduction of
realistic variation in hours per worker.
4.3 Robustness to Alternative Labour Supply Elasticities
A labour supply elasticity of 0 is implicit in studies in the labour market search literature that
rely only on the extensive margin for adjusting labour input. Our preferred model is calibrated
to a labour supply elasticity of 0.9 (corresponding to ψ = 2.25) in order to match the volatility
of hours per worker. Given the structure of the model this is the "correct" ψ. However, a range
of ψ ∈ [0, 1], are supported by empirical evidence, Blundell and McCurdy (1999). Here we briefly
consider the sensitivity of our measure of reallocative and other macroeconomic activity in our
model to alternative values of ψ. We consider values of H ∈ [0.01, 1]. Our results are summarised
in Figure (1).23 Panel (a) displays measures of reallocation and other correlations relating to labour
market flows. The improvement in these metrics associated with the introduction of variation in
hours per worker relies upon a relatively elastic parameterisation of labour supply. Panels (b), (c)
and (d) show the volatility of unemployment, labour market tightness, job creation and vacancies.
For the aspects of the model displayed in these panels, the eﬀects of hours variation only emerges
for relatively elastic hours per worker, around the value used in the experiment described in Table
(2).
23In constructing Figure (1) we adjust the standard deviation of productivity shocks to hold the volatility of output
constant and adjust the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks to hold the volatility of job destruction constant
at their respective values observed in US data.
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4.4 The Eﬀect of Real and Nominal Shocks
Finally consider Columns (3), (4), (6) and (7) in Table (2), which decomposes the eﬀect of the
variation in labour supply by the source of shocks. We deliberately avoid re-calibrating to match
features of the data, as our aim is to show the contribution of individual shocks to the overall
response.24 Figures (2) and (3) document impulse response functions for output, inflation and
hours (panels (a) and (d)), vacancies and unemployment (panels (b) and (e)) and job creation and
destruction (panel (c) and (f)) to monetary and productivity impulses. These oﬀer an alternative
means to picture the dynamic adjustment in the face of shocks.
Notice that in our calibration monetary shocks exhibit less persistence than productivity shocks.
From Columns (3) and (6) we see that monetary shocks also account for a lower fraction of output
variation with inelastic hours than in the case of elastic hours. In the inelastic hours environment,
the intensive margin cannot be used to adjust to shocks, and firms are reliant on the extensive
margin, see Figure (2), panels (c) and (d) and Columns (3) and (4). So, to respond to shocks,
long-run relationships must either be created or destroyed. This means that it is particularly
costly to adjust to temporary shocks in the inelastic hours case, so that monetary shocks account
for a relatively small component of output fluctuations. Also, in the short-run, firms tend to
make greater use of job destruction rather than job creation to respond to shocks since the latter
activity is more costly, see Figure (2). Now, for the inelastic hours case, consider a monetary
shock that leads to a fall in job destruction and unemployment. This does not greatly raise the
value of creating a new match, because the lack of persistence of the shock generates a small,
temporary deviation from steady state, see Figure (2). On the other hand, the fall in the fraction
of unemployed workers reduces the probability of filling a match. Taking these eﬀects together,
vacancies and job creation will be below average at the very point in time when job destruction
and unemployment are low, see Figure (2) panels (d) and (f). This will generate a positively sloped
Beveridge curve and a positive correlation (synchronisation) of gross job flows as in Column (3).
By contrast, when hours can vary, this margin can be used to adjust to shocks. This enables
24An alternative to our calibration approach would be to estimate the relative importance of the shocks using a full
information approach, to impose the discipline of formal statistical criteria. Given the diﬃculties of matching the
behaviour of vacancies we adopt the simpler calibration based strategy, recognising its limitations.
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transitory monetary shocks to play a greater role in accounting for output variability than in the
inelastic case. For example, compare the output responses in panel (b) of Figures (2) and (3). As
discussed above, the response to monetary shocks under elastic hours aﬀects rents in a way that
reduces the economy’s reliance on the extensive margin, desynchronises job flows and generates a
downward sloping Beveridge curve, see Column (6). This insight is confirmed in Figure (3) panel
(b).
With frictions in nominal price setting, a positive productivity shock raises unemployment in
the short run. Yet poductivity shocks are persistent, so a shock which raises unemployment is likely
to temper the tendency to open vacancies and create jobs in the short-run. Consider the inelastic
hours case in Figure (2) panel (c). In the short-run unemployment and vacancies both rise in the
face of a positive productivity shock. Thereafter, as the price level adjusts unemployment declines.
Nonetheless, high rents due to the persistence of the productivity shock leads to persistently high
vacancies. So in the inelastic case it is the long-run behaviour of unemployment and vacancies
which generates a downward sloping Beveridge curve. Of course, since the search environment
satisfies the Hosios condition, seperations are eﬃcient, so job creation and job destruction are
positively correlated. To reconcile the behaviour of the Beveridge curve and the correlation of
gross job flows, note that job destruction is only weakly correlated with unemployment in Table
(2). The impact variable hours on the response to a productivity shock is to reduce the degree of
synchronisation of job flows, to see this compare panel (e) in Figures (2) and (3). In the elastic
case, the responses to a productivity shock are more muted (than in the inelastic case).
Figures (2) and (3) confirm the relative lack of persistence of the eﬀects of a monetary shock
in comparison to a technology shock, and highlight the role of hours per worker in adjustment to
shocks. The impulse response functions also illustrate the strong degree of association of vacancies
and job creation and the comparative lack of persistence in these two variables in the elastic hours
case.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we show that one simple modification, the introduction of realistic variation in
hours per worker, allows a New Keynesian model with labour market search and endogenous job
destruction to account for the direction and to some extent the strength of reallocative activity
(measured by the Beveridge curve and the correlation of gross job flows). We also show that
the impact of hours variation is enhanced by temporary shocks. These results are interesting
for two reasons. Firstly, because there is considerable evidence that reallocative activity and
microeconomic restructuring underlie business cycles and growth, yet is almost completely ignored
in the New Keynesian literature on unemployment even in those papers which allow endogenous
job destruction. Secondly because they provide a simple example of a situation in which incentives
for intertemporal substitution can resolve the diﬃculty of capturing measures of reallocation based
on gross job flows while satisfying the Hosios condition.
At the same time realistic variation in hours leads predominantly to plausible behaviour of other
more traditional macroeconomic aggregates. Our strategy of adjusting parameters to maintain
the variability of job destruction and of output across experiments allows us to confirm, using
a diﬀerent methodology from Andres et al. (2006), that a New Keynesian model with frictions
in price setting captures a large part of the volatility of unemployment, and in the inelastic
case vacancies also. Unfortunately while the amplitude of unemployment fluctuations increases
towards that observed in the data once we allow for realistic hours variation, the amplitude of
vacancy fluctuations declines. In addition vacancies lack persistence once realistic hours variation
is permitted and is too strongly associated with job creation. Since we deem an account of
reallocative activity important this leaves a role for other solutions to the unemployment-vacancy-
tightness volatility puzzle such as wage rigidity or departures from the Hosios condition suggested
by Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005) respectively. One possible solution to the
absence of vacancy persistence might be to introduce fixed costs of posting a vacancy, as in Fujita
and Ramey (2007b), into our monetary model with endogenous job destruction. This is the subject
of ongoing research.
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Nevertheless, the success of the model in capturing the behaviour of unemployment and mea-
sures of reallocation while including endogenous job destruction may oﬀer a suitable starting point
for monetary policy analysis - quantitative diﬃculties in relation to vacancies and wages notwith-
standing.
.
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6 Appendix: Data, Calibration andModel SolutionMethod
6.1 Data
We attempt to match the second moments of seasonally adjusted quarterly US macroeconomic
and labour market data. Unless otherwise indicated, the data used are available on the BEA and
BLS websites. Our sample period, 1972:2-1993:4, in common with other studies, is limited by
the availability of published job flows data, see Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1998). We use
real GDP data from NIPA as our measure of output. To express this in per capita terms we
deflate by the BLS civilian population over 16. Inflation is the percentage change in the seasonally
adjusted NIPA implicit GDP deflator. US M1 money supply, used to estimate the properties
of the exogenous money supply process, is taken from OECD Main Economic Indicators. The
Conference-Board-Help-Wanted Index is used as our measure of vacancies. The unemployment
rate is the oﬃcial BLS unemployment rate for those over 16. The rates of gross job creation and
job destruction relate to the manufacturing sector only, see Davis et al. and are available from
Haltiwanger’s website. Because of the sector-specific nature of the job flows data, we use data for
employment, wages and hours per worker that pertain specifically to US manufacturing.25
6.2 Calibration
The parameters of the model are summarised in Table (1). We begin with a number of relatively
uncontroversial parameters. The discount factor, β, is set to 0.99 to target an annual real interest
rate of 4%. The elasticity of substitution between goods in the final goods sector is set at ε = 21
to give a markup of 5%, as in Jung and Kuester (2006). The value of ε is at the upper end of those
found in the New Keynesian literature. It implies profits attributable to final goods producers are
low, consisent with the NIPA compensation data.
The severity of nominal price-setting frictions is governed by the parameters τ and ω. The
first, τ , represents the fraction of those firms which set prices in any given period that do so in a
25In relation to the data the main source of controversy concerns data for total hours worked per capita. Economy
wide data appear to exhibit a trend. If the hours per capita data contain a unit root, then authors may use of
diﬀerenced data in analysing the economy’s response to a technology shock. This choice may determine the sign of
the response to a technology shock, see Christiano et al. (2006), Gali (1999) for further discussion. However, the
data (and the model simulated series) we use are HP-filtered which removes any (unwanted) trend before moments
are calculated so this debate is of less direct relevance except in as much as it aﬀects the choice series. In addition,
the use of manufacturing industry data sidesteps controversies since hours worked appear to be stationary.
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backward-looking manner. The second, ω, represents the probability with which any given final
good producer gets the opportunity to reset the price of the good. This determines the average
duration of a newly set price. While we could set ω to whatever value is required to match
inflation volatility, the implied price durations would be unreasonable. Instead we set ω = 0.8,
which indicates that on average a newly set price lasts for 5 quarters before being reset. This is
within the range of values considered reasonable by Gali and Gertler (1999), from estimates of the
underlying price adjustment model with aggregate data. Recent evidence from micro data, Bils
and Klenow (2004), has suggested that prices may change more frequently, on average once every
six months. This is diﬃcult to rationalise in environments, such as ours, where the price setting
and factor adjustment decisions are separated.26 Given the separation assumption that we make
it is more appropriate to target the price duration estimates. Following the evidence of Gali and
Gertler (1999) and Christiano et al. (2005) and others we set τ = 0.5. The deviation between
model generated inflation and the data, gives an indication of model fit along this dimension.
We follow the standard approach in the literature and set the autocorrelation of aggregate
productivity innovations in quarterly data to ρZ = 0.95. We allow the standard deviation, σZ ,
of aggregate productivity shocks to vary across our experiments in order to target the standard
deviation of output in the data over our sample period: σY = 0.0168. In relation to money supply
growth, we adopt the approach of Krause and Lubik (2007) and model growth in M1 as a AR1
process. These authors use the estimates provided by Cooley and Hansen (1989). For our sample
period the estimate of the autocorrelation coeﬃcient, ρυ = 0.5, as in Cooley and Hansen (1989),
while the standard deviation of the innovation process is slightly lower, σv = 0.004. We set the
elasticity of money demand with respect to consumption, ξ = 1, consistent with the estimates
provided by Mankiw and Summers (1986). Then ΥM
P
= MPY is set at 17, to target average income
velocity of money over the sample period.
Next we turn to labour market parameters, we begin with relatively uncontroversial parameters
concerning labour market flows and the parameters of the matching function. The average job
26Altig (2005) and others have made progress in reconciling the new micro price adjustment evidence with observed
aggregate inflation dynamics by extending the standard New Keynesian model to allow for firm specific capital
adjustment decisions. Kuester (2007) integrates price setting, production and factor adjustment decisions in a
single sector, but he only allows for exogenous job destruction.
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destruction rate is set at 10% per quarter, λ = 0.1, following the evidence of Den Haan et al.
(2000), Shimer (2005). We follow, Shimer, (2005), Jung (2005) and others in targeting a steady
state employment rate of N = 0.94, consistent with BLS estimates of the average unemployment
rate.27 To achieve that target, we set the probability of finding a job pU = 0.61.28 We follow
Den Haan et al. (2000) in calibrating the probability of filling a vacancy, pV = 0.7 to match US
data. The scaling parameter of the matching function, M = 0.654 is chosen to target a matching
function exponent of γ = 0.5. This lies within the range of plausible values discussed by Petongolo
and Pissarides (2001) who suggest γ ∈ [0.3, 0.5]. Following Den Haan et al. (2000), the fraction
of jobs destroyed exogenously in steady state is set at λx = 0.068 to target a steady state job
creation rate of 0.052, as estimated from plant level data by Davis et al. (1998). The rate of job
destruction and job creation will equal in steady state. There is little formal evidence to guide
the properties of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks. We follow Dean Haan et al. in assuming
that idiosyncratic shocks are log-normally distributed, with mean µX = E [lnX] and standard
deviation σX . Rather than allow both µX and σX to vary across experiments, we follow the
standard approach in the literature and fix µX . We allow the standard deviation of idiosyncratic
shocks, σX , to vary across experiments so as to match the variability of job flows in the data
relative to that of output, σJD/σY . Increases in µX raise σX . At low µX ≈ 0 the numerical
integration over X that we use sometimes do not converge so here we set µX = −1.5, but our
results do not depend on this particular choice. Given µX , σX , λ and λ
x we the job destruction
threshold, X¯, and then determine F = F ¡X¯¢−1 R X¯
0
Xf (X) dX.29
There has been considerable discussion over the calibration of worker bargaining power, the
match surplus (the profits over which both parties in a match bargain), and the value of a worker’s
outside option. Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005) argue that the results of Shimer (2005) on
27Some authors, Andolfatto (1995), Trigari (2006) employ much lower values of steady state employment, 0.54 and
0.75 respectively. One justification for this approach is that it implicitly allows for the presence of transitions from
employment to out of the labour force. However, it is then diﬃcult to argue that one can match the properties of
unemployment data. In addition, this approach may distort the cyclical properties of the model by allowing the
size of the pool of unemployed individuals to remains relatively stable in the face of shocks.
28This is higher than in Shimer (2005), Jung (2005). The reason is that in discrete time models with endgenous job
destruction, following Den Haan et al. (2000), job destruction occurs prior to search and the number of searchers
in steady state is given by 1− (1− λ)N rather than 1−N aswith exogenous destruction.
29We allow idiosyncraic shocks to enter firms’ profit functions additively, so we include the constant F to eliminate
the eﬀect of cost shocks on aggregate profits. In Krause and Lubik (2007), Walsh (2005) this does not arise because
idiosyncraic shocks enter multiplicatively. We avoid the latter structure as it generates unreasonable idiosyncratic
hours. In Trigari (2006) this concern does not arise because additive idiosyncratic shocks enter the utility function.
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the failure of the canonical Mortensen-Pissarides model are sensitive to his calibration of these
features.30 Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005) show that the volatility of unemployment, vacancies
and labour market tightness, key problems identified by Shimer, can be rectified by assigning a
low value to the match surplus, a low bargaining power for workers as captured by η and a high
value for the outside option (due implicitly to home production and the utility value of nonwork)
so as to give a small diﬀerence between the value of work and non-work. By contrast Shimer
adopts the standard Hosios condition η = γ and assumes that a worker’s outside option comprises
only the value of unemployment benefits, then to obtain suﬃcient variability in unemployment
and vacancies, he introduces wage rigidity in an ad hoc manner.
For worker bargaining power, since we wish to examine the eﬀect of hours variation on the
slope of the Beveridge curve and the correlation between gross job flows in a constrained eﬃcient
environment, we assume that worker bargaining power satisfies the Hosios condition η = γ = 0.5.
The free entry condition links the cost of vacancy creation to the match surplus (or more precisely
the profit share attributable to matches). Jung (2006) argues that unlike the vacancy posting
cost this profit share is directly observable, at least in principle (from NIPA compensation data).
In his model, which lacks monopolistic competition, he suggests sensible values lie in the range
[0.002, 0.05]. In our New Keynesian environment, with monopolistic competition, a figure of less
than 1% seems plausible. This is consistent with the estimates of Jung and Kuester (2006).
Consequently we set vacancy costs, κ, to target a profit share attributable to matches of 0.5%. In
our framework, with endogenous job destruction, vacancy posting costs vary across experiments
as the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks is varied to match σJD/σY .
Shimer (2005) adopts a value for the outside option of 40% of labour income, based on the role
of benefits alone. Krussell et al. (2005) argue that such a value is likely to overstate the value of
unemployment benefits. They suggest that the evidence favours an upper bound of 20% of labour
income. As Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005), Jung (2005) argue, rather than the replacement ratio
implied by benefits per se, it is the diﬀerence between the value of work and of non-work that is of
30Jung (2006) generalises Hagedorn and Manowskii’s analysis to a real business cycle framework with capital, risk
averse agents and hours choice. Both Hagedorn and Manowskii (2005) and Jung (2006) follow Shimer (2005) and
suppress the endogenous job destruction that is key to our analysis.
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critical importance for the amplitude of unemployment fluctuations. The value of non-work may
include comprises formal unemployment benefits and the value of home production and leisure.
Jung (2005) shows that realistic unemployment variation may arise despite relatively low formal
unemployment benefits. Our approach implicitly sets tbenefits equal to zero and allows the value
of leisure to determine the worker’s outside option.
When individuals are risk averse and hours of employment can vary, then the parameters φ and
ψ, governing the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution can aﬀect the value
of a workers outside option. To avoid the use of φ, the inverse of the elasticity of substitution, as
a free parameter, we normalise φ = 1. This is consistent with the fact that we use σZ to pin down
the variability of output and equilibrium requires that Ct = Yt . This case, utility logarithmic in
consumption, is easily justifiable as a target on the basis of microeconometric and macroeconomic
evidence. Reichling (2007) claims that unemployed workers spend on average as litttle as three
minutes per week engaged in job search. We set hours worked as a fraction of the time endowment
as H = 0.33. We set e = 0.01H which means search occupies around 5 minutes. Then we vary ψ
across experiments and allow the value of leisure to vary as a result, with the first order condition
for hours determining ΥH .
6.3 Model Solution Method
The log-linearsied approximation to the system of equations, (12), (17) and (21) - (31), is stacked
in the form
AEt [Yt+1] = B · Yt + C · Zt
Where Zt is a vector of exogenous state variables (zˆt and υˆt) and Yt is a vector of endogenous jump
(yˆt,hˆt, uˆt, vˆt, jˆct, jˆdt, pˆt, wˆt, µˆt, πˆt, rˆ
n
t , mˆt, pˆ
V
t , xˆ) and state (nˆt, πˆt−1, mˆt−1, pˆt−1) variables, and
A, B and C are conformable matrices of coeﬃcients.31 The system is solved with MATLAB, 7.0.1,
using McCallum’s (1998) undetermined coeﬃcients approach based on Klein’s (1997) generalised
Schur decomposition method.
31The full system, Yt, includes a definition of the inflation rate πˆt = pˆt − pˆt−1, updating equations for cˆt−1, πˆt−1,
mˆt−1 and pˆt−1, and additional auxilliary variables including labour market tightness θˆt = vˆt − uˆt and real wages.
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Parameter Meaning Value
β Rate of time preference 0.99
ε Elasticity of substitution between goods 21
ω Probability of price non-adjustment 0.8
τ Fraction of backward-looking firms 0.5
ρZ Productivity shock autocorrelation 0.95
ρv Monetary shock autocorrelation 0.5
σv Monetary shock standard deviation 0.004
ξ (Income) Elasticity of money demand 1
ΥM
P
Scaling factor: utility of real balances 17
λ Separation rate 0.1
pU Probability of finding employment 0.61
pV Probability of filling a vacancy 0.7
M Scaling factor: matching function 0.654
λx Exogenous separation rate 0.068
JD Job destruction rate 0.052
η Worker bargaining power 0.5
φ Elasticity of Intertemporal substitution 1
H Hours per worker / total time endowment 0.33
e Hours of search per unemployed worker 0.0033
Table 1: Calibration: Parameters and Targets
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Figure 1: Role of Labour Supply Elasticity
.
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Statistic Data
Inelastic
Labour
ψ : 200
σX : 0.80
σZ : 0.009
Elastic
Labour
ψ : 2.25
σX : 0.57
σZ : 0.021
Shock
Col. No.
Data
(1)
Both
(2)
M
(3)
Z
(4)
Both
(5)
M
(6)
Z
(7)
Standard
Deviations
Output 1.00 1.00 0.29 0.95 1.00 0.52 0.86
Inflation 0.21 0.40 0.72 0.34 0.28 0.21 0.31
Wage 0.52 5.95 13.31 4.48 1.65 1.64 1.66
Hours / worker 0.73 0.10 0.24 0.08 0.57 0.34 0.65
Employment 0.66 0.67 0.57 0.68 0.76 0.55 0.82
Unemployment 7.21 5.19 7.11 4.93 6.15 4.36 6.62
Vacancies 8.04 5.06 5.06 5.04 2.88 2.08 3.14
Job Creation 5.09 7.26 10.94 6.70 5.45 3.80 8.29
Job Destruction 8.97 8.87 20.33 6.53 8.89 6.19 5.91
Tightness 15.02 7.73 2.67 8.08 7.69 5.54 9.69
Correlations
Unemployment -
Vacancies
-0.94 -0.15 0.96 -0.32 -0.37 -0.41 -0.36
Job Creation -
Job Destruction
-0.41 0.74 0.90 0.71 -0.34 -0.39 -0.34
Hours -
Employment
0.89 0.13 -0.11 0.21 0.24 0.08 0.24
Unemployment -
Inflation
-0.65 -0.65 -0.97 -0.56 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95
Vacancies -
Job Creation
-0.03 0.86 0.98 0.86 0.61 0.61 0.62
Unemployment -
Job Destruction
0.67 0.42 0.88 0.25 0.62 0.62 0.63
Autocorrel’ns
Output 0.87 0.89 0.47 0.94 0.87 0.65 0.95
Inflation 0.57 0.59 0.49 0.64 0.84 0.84 0.84
Table 2: Business Cycle Statistics
All statistics computed from HP detrended series, smoothing parameter 1600.
All model statistics are averaged across 100 simulations. Data : 1972:2 - 1993:4.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses: Inelastic Hours
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Figure 3: Impusle Responses: Elastic Hours
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